Dare to Dream: The 28th Amendment

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Proposed Twenty-Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

Section 1 — Unanimous Judicial Authority

No decision, judgment, opinion, order, or decree of the Supreme Court of the United States shall have force of law unless joined unanimously by all Justices then in active service and eligible to participate.

In the absence of unanimous consent, the decision of the court or courts below shall stand without precedential effect.

Section 2 — Opinions and Dissents

Nothing in this article shall prohibit any Justice from issuing concurring, dissenting, or advisory opinions.
Such opinions shall have no binding legal effect unless accompanied by unanimous consent as required in Section 1.

Section 3 — Department of Justice

The Department of Justice is hereby constituted as an independent judicial enforcement body under the supervisory authority of the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Attorney General of the United States shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of the United States by unanimous consent of all Justices then in active service and eligible to participate, and may be removed only by unanimous consent of the Supreme Court, pursuant to procedures established by law.

Section 4 — Mandatory Retirement

No person shall serve as a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States beyond the age of seventy-five years.

A Justice attaining the age of seventy-five shall retire at the conclusion of the Supreme Court term during which such age is reached.

Section 5 — Implementation

Congress shall have the power to enforce and implement this article by appropriate legislation, provided that no such legislation shall impair the independence, unanimity requirement, or supervisory authority of the Supreme Court as defined within this amendment.

Section 6 — Applicability

This article shall apply to all cases pending on or after the date of ratification.
Any Justice serving at the time of ratification who has attained the age of seventy-five years may complete the then-current Supreme Court term.

A Structural Amendment to Restore Judicial Legitimacy and the Rule of Law

This amendment proposes a deliberate restructuring of constitutional power in response to an unmistakable problem: the politicization of justice itself. Over time, the Supreme Court has come to be perceived not as an impartial arbiter of law, but as a rotating instrument of ideological control. Simultaneously, the Department of Justice—endowed with immense coercive power—has increasingly functioned as an extension of executive will, vulnerable to political priorities, selective enforcement, and retaliatory prosecution.

The amendment responds to these failures not through moral appeals, but through structural design.


Unanimity as a Constitutional Safeguard

At the core of the amendment is a simple principle: no legal ruling should bind an entire nation unless it endures the scrutiny of every Justice entrusted with constitutional judgment.

Unanimous consent has long been recognized as essential where liberty is most at risk. In criminal trials, unanimity is required because the cost of error is irreparable. Constitutional interpretation carries a similar gravity. Supreme Court rulings reshape civic life, reorder rights, and alter the balance of governmental power. When narrow majorities render such decisions, they invite instability, erosion of trust, and cycles of reversal that track electoral change rather than judicial clarity.

Requiring unanimity does not silence disagreement. Justices remain free—indeed encouraged—to express dissenting views. What changes is the consequence of division. In the absence of consensus, the Court refrains from imposing a national rule and allows existing law to stand. This assures that constitutional change arises only from shared conviction rather than transient alignment.

The result is a judiciary that persuades rather than commands, stabilizes rather than oscillates, and earns legitimacy through restraint.


Depoliticizing Justice by Deweaponizing Enforcement

Just as important is the amendment’s restructuring of the Department of Justice.

Under the current framework, the Department of Justice exists within the Executive Branch, subject to presidential appointment, influence, and removal. While safeguards exist, the structural reality remains: prosecutorial discretion—among the most powerful tools of government—is entangled with political authority.

This amendment breaks that entanglement.

By placing the Department of Justice under the supervisory authority of the Supreme Court, the amendment redefines prosecution as a legal function rather than a political instrument. Enforcement of law becomes accountable to constitutional interpretation, not electoral mandate. The Attorney General is appointed and overseen by the judiciary, guaranteeing continuity, neutrality, and insulation from partisan cycles.

This shift does not weaken law enforcement. It strengthens it by anchoring prosecutorial power to legal obligation rather than political opportunity. The amendment thus removes the incentive to weaponize justice against opponents or shield allies, renewing public confidence that the law is applied evenly and without fear or favor.


Judicial Renewal Without Political Dependence

Mandatory retirement at age seventy-five assures that judicial authority remains vigorous, current, and accountable to developing legal understanding without resorting to elections or term limits that would undermine independence. This provision prevents strategic retirements, reduces vacancy manipulation, and guarantees periodic renewal of the Court without politicizing tenure.


A Court That Cannot Be Captured

Taken together, these reforms create a Supreme Court that cannot be captured by ideology, timing, or executive pressure. The absence of majority rule eliminates incentives for partisan appointments aimed at tipping narrow balances. The separation of prosecution from executive control removes the threat of political coercion. The requirement of unanimity assures that national rules emerge only where constitutional meaning is clear enough to command collective assent.

This amendment does not promise faster justice. It promises truer justice.

It accepts that restraint is not weakness, that disagreement is not failure, and that power should advance only where consensus exists. In doing so, it reaffirms the Constitution not as a battlefield of factions, but as a shared legal foundation worthy of enduring trust.